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 RESEARCH REPORTS AND NOTES
 CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN ELECTIONS
 IN THE CITY OF BUENOS AIRES, 1931-1954*
 Darfo Canton, Universidad de Buenos Aires
 Jorge Raul Jorrat, Universidad de Buenos Aires
 In 1930 the first successful military coup in Argentina in the twen-
 tieth century interrupted the normal functioning of the political and elec-
 toral institutions consolidated by the Saenz Pefia Law of 1912. This statute
 required secret balloting by all Argentine men eighteen and older. The
 coup of 1930, followed by a failed attempt to achieve legitimatization at
 the ballot box in 1931, reversed the development of electoral politics in Ar-
 gentina by reverting to open fraud and provoking the abstention of the
 main national political party up to that time, the Union Civica Radical
 (UCR).
 These events may explain the lack of interest in electoral research
 on this era, for which almost no studies exist. But in the Federal Capital,
 at least, elections enjoyed a reasonable climate of legitimacy, a kind of es-
 cape valve in a context of high visibility.
 The capital had always been an electoral mirror for the country, the
 place where virtually all the national political forces originated (the well-
 *This research note was translated from Spanish by Sharon Kellum and Gilbert W. Merkx.
 The authors wish to express their thanks to Marta Valle, Chief of the Departamento de Es-
 tadisticas of the Direcci6n Nacional Electoral, Ministerio del Interior, for her help in obtain-
 ing voting information. They are equally grateful to Gerardo Adrogue, Isidoro Cheresky,
 Gilbert Merkx, Sharon Kellum, and the anonymous LARR readers for their helpful com-
 ments. The data used in this study are part of the historical-electoral database that the au-
 thors are compiling for the Centro de Estudios de Opini6n Publica (CEDOP-UBA) in the Ins-
 tituto de Investigaciones Gino Germani of the Facultad de Ciencias Sociales at the
 Universidad de Buenos Aires. Construction of the database has partly relied on a grant from
 the Secretaria de Ciencia y Tecnica of the Universidad de Buenos Aires since 1995.
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 known exception being the Partido Democrata Progresista, which arose in
 Santa Fe). The capital was also the epicenter of the struggles, currents, and
 emerging factions that then could spread throughout the rest of the coun-
 try This special character is attested by the greater dispersion of the vote
 in the capital and its being the only place with a significant socialist pres-
 ence from the late nineteenth century until the emergence of Peronism in
 1946. The fact that so little research exists on elections in the area least af-
 fected by fraud during the "decada infame" of the 1930s makes the current
 exploration of special interest.
 In periodizing our series of studies on the elections in the Federal
 Capital, it seemed to us appropriate to combine the period from 1930 to
 1942 with the following years encompassing the rise of Peronism up to the
 last election before the 1955 military coup that ousted the Peronist govern-
 ment. This bracketing allows consideration of the transition period pre-
 ceding the 1943 coup d'etat that gave rise to Peronism. Beginning in
 1938-1940, a dissolution of the electoral patterns in place since 1912 can be
 observed, along with little-noticed emergent coalitions in the presidential
 elections of 1937. These changes appear to have been precursors of more
 drastic changes in the national political scene. Hence arises our interest in
 combining analyses of the Peronist era with those of the decada infame. It
 can also be noted that few electoral studies have focused on Peronism in the
 Federal Capital, which includes some of the least propitious terrain for the
 movement since its inception. The capital demonstrated the limits of
 Peron's political power in winning the votes of the Argentine majority.'
 In this research, we are focusing on changes in voting patterns. We
 also hope to contribute to the debate over the rise of Peronism by using
 data limited to the Federal Capital, a limitation that gives a certain auster-
 ity to our findings. That is to say, we are inquiring into the possible exis-
 tence of "deviations" from patterns previously detected, whether intro-
 duced by fraud at the national level and the abstention of the Union Civica
 Radical or by the emergence of the new party that in 1946 came to domi-
 nate the electoral scene and created an unprecedented polarization. All
 these developments occurred in the capital, locus of the greatest political
 participation in Argentina.
 Little electoral research exists for the years 1931-1942 (excluding our
 own research), in contrast to the abundance of studies on the rise of Peron-
 ism. Only three works took the Federal Capital into account, and then in an
 exclusionary manner for 1940 or later: an initial study by Gino Germani
 (1955), that of Walter Little (1973), and those of Lars Schoultz (1973, 1983).
 Other studies of the capital focus on earlier phases, like those of Richard
 Walter (1978,1993) and that of David Rock (1977) to a certain extent.
 1. This situation explains the "gerrymandering" of 1951, which sought by arbitrary but
 carefully crafted geographical redistribution of the districts (circunscripciones) to reduce the
 opposition's representation in Congress.
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 The present study is the continuation of a similar one dedicated to
 the period 1912-1930 (see Canton and Jorrat 1996). The first stage (1931-
 1942) transpired in a global context of a serious and unexpected economic
 crisis. This period also witnessed the strengthening grip of Joseph Stalin
 in the Soviet Union and the emergence and consolidation of the Nazi
 and Fascist regimes in Europe, the Spanish Civil War, and the beginning
 of World War II. Each of these events affected the Argentine political-
 electoral spectrum. The second stage (1943-1954) began with the coup
 that made room for Peronism to emerge, in the international context of
 the winding down of World War II and the start of the cold war. These
 years also witnessed the beginning of the crisis in Argentina in import-
 substitution industrialization, which had significant impact on the politi-
 cal scene.
 In our previous work (Canton and Jorrat 1996), we noted that be-
 tween 1912 and 1930 a definite socio-spatial polarization existed between
 the two political sectors. The Partido Socialista had greater success in
 working-class neighborhoods, while the parties that we call "terceras
 fuerzas" (which were broadly conservative) got better results in areas with
 more middle-upper strata. Between the two, occupying a sliding position
 along the spectrum, was the Union Civica Radical, which lacked spatial
 links to the various occupational categories but was stronger in the dis-
 tricts dominated by the middle sectors (particularly sectors employed in
 nonmanual labor).
 In our earlier study (1996) and two others in progress on the same
 subject and same geographical unit (the city of Buenos Aires), our goal has
 been to advance knowledge of the social bases of the political parties and
 their continuities, within the limits of the available data.2 Because no polls
 exist for the period under consideration, researchers must inevitably rely
 on the use of aggregate secondary data. Given the intent to link socio-
 spatial aspects to voting, the use of ecological correlations is unavoidable.
 Such correlations inevitably introduce limitations on the theoretical and
 conceptual possibilities of our analysis.3
 The fact that we are dealing here with a single district, with its par-
 ticular role in the history of the country, places another limit on general-
 izations or historical comparisons. This research note is essentially a case
 study bounded temporally in the history of a capital city (1931-1954). The
 larger study envisioned by the authors includes a longer span of events. It
 begins with 1904, when Ley 4161 (approved by the Congress in December
 2. Few types of data are differentiated by voting district in the Federal Capital, and the few
 that exist lack continuity. The data compiled by the authors for this study can be obtained
 from CEDOP-UBA, J. E. Uriburu 950, 6to. piso, Capital Federal 1114. E-mail address:
 jrjl@fsoc.uba.ar
 3. We refer to the issue of "the ecological fallacy" as well as to the limitations of correla-
 tions in general.
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 1902) was enacted, which required enrollment of the entire male population
 eighteen and older and divided the city into twenty new districts. The study
 continues up to the designation in 1996 of the first Jefe de Gobierno popu-
 larly elected by the citizens of the capital (Canton and Jorrat 1997b, 1997c).
 The larger study takes as its central focus the continuity of class-
 linked zones of urban ecology or socio-spatial configurations that were
 associated with the major political parties active in the Federal Capital. In
 this regard, we are also examining the various strains of radicalismo, which
 were ill-defined in socio-spatial terms due to the variability of the sectors
 associated with them. The continuities were so strong that even during the
 ban on Peronism (from 1957 to 1965), dichotomous patterns that emerged
 with Peronism were maintained (Canton and Jorrat 1997a).
 Previous discussions have centered on identifying patterns of sup-
 port and the numbers voting for the various parties. Some of these seemed
 to question the existence of a class vote before the Peronist era. This inter-
 pretation is suggested in the synthesis offered by Luigi Manzetti (1993),
 which began with studies by Gino Germani (1955) and Pedro Huerta
 Palau (1963). Manzetti reported that these works were later questioned by
 Lars Schoultz (1973,1983). Our impression is that Manzetti did not exam-
 ine in detail the findings of Schoultz or those of Huerta Palau on the city
 of Cordoba (see Canton 1973,153, n. 4).4 In any case, Richard Walter's (1978)
 work as well as our own (1996) indicate the existence of a strong tendency
 toward socio-spatial class voting since the beginning of the twentieth cen-
 tury, at least in the city of Buenos Aires. Our findings suggest that this ten-
 dency continued through the period from 1931 to 1942. Analysts who
 question the existence of a socio-spatial class vote prior to 1946 may have
 been misled by some temporary changes toward the end of the 1930s that
 began to be reversed beginning in 1942.
 ASPECTS OF THE NEW PERIOD
 In the new electoral period, we distinguish two phases, 1931-1942
 and 1946-1954, which exhibit different histories and a change of actors. In
 the first stage, the earlier pattern of socio-spatial differentiation between
 the Partido Socialista and the Terceras Fuerzas was broadly maintained,
 but only from the beginning of the decade until the mid-1930s. Then both
 factions lost some of their previous socio-spatial characteristics. For ex-
 4. Canton indicated that the correlations of Huerta Palau for the UCR are positive with
 workers but negative with the independents in 1935 (Canton 1973, p. 153, n. 4). If the studies
 by Gonzalez Esteves of the province of C6rdoba are examined, data for 1940 (when the eco-
 logical correlations waned in the Federal Capital) show a definite dichotomous pattern sep-
 arating the Partido Dem6crata (conservative) from the UCR (a popular party), particularly
 in the central zone (which includes the capital of the province) and in the southern zone (see
 Mora y Araujo and Llorente 1980, p. 354, t. 10). The same pattern is observed in the results
 obtained by Schoultz for the Federal Capital in 1942 (Schoultz 1973, 53, t. 5).
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 ample, by 1940 the Terceras Fuerzas were showing a notable positive cor-
 relation with semi-skilled workers, while the Partido Socialista showed
 positive but not significant correlations with manual workers.
 After its ouster, the UCR contested elections again only in 1936. It
 won broadly in the 1936 elections, with patterns similar to those of 1938,
 1940, and 1942, although its spatial association with the worker categories
 was lower than in 1930. In the presidential election of 1937, much of the
 leftist vote (the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores, the Partido Comu-
 nista, and the Partido Socialista) favored the radical candidate, and the
 consequences can be seen in correlations totally atypical of the UCR.
 These patterns, however, were never to be repeated.5
 The period 1946-1954 is homogeneous, if rather short, in that the
 political-electoral confrontations crystallized as never before in the his-
 tory of Argentina. The world was divided into black and white, Peronism
 versus anti-Peronism. Peronism dominated in the areas where the Partido
 Socialista and other leftist forces had attained the best results earlier. Anti-
 Peronist forces united the two parties that historically had fought for domi-
 nation of the Federal Capital-the UCR and the PS, along with conserva-
 tive sectors. In the deputy elections of 1946, the UCR showed very
 different socio-spatial patterns from its previous profile, more like those
 of the conservative forces, and it captured handily far more of the votes
 opposing Peronism than did the socialists in the same elections. In all re-
 spects, the PS set new patterns that differed totally from those exhibited
 before Peronism. In 1946 the spatial profiles of radicalismo and socialismo
 were very similar, except that the UCR generally showed higher positive
 correlations than the PS with the nonmanual sectors and higher negative
 correlations with the manual sectors. With the rise of Peronism, the socio-
 spatial bases of the UCR and the PS were radically transformed and be-
 came more alike.
 THE FIRST PHASE, 1931-1942
 Table 1 displays the percentages won by the main parties that were
 active in all the years under consideration. During the first phase,
 1931-1942, there were eight years in which more than one election took
 5. According to Puiggr6s, "the Partido Comunista and the Partido Socialista Obrero
 launched the slogan 'El radicalismo al poder y Alvear a la presidencia"' (1967-1968, 4:291).
 Meanwhile, the PS dropped from 22.9 percent in 1936 to 5.7 percent the next year. It is the flip
 side of what Nicolas Repetto pointed out with respect to radical voters at the beginning of
 the decade: "With the right to run candidates in the elections of 8 November 1931 snatched
 away from the radicals, many of them voted for the presidential slate of the progressive
 socialist-democrat alliance and for the slate of national legislators of the Partido Socialista.
 Thanks to this spontaneous and valuable support, our party won the two senate seats and
 the majority of the deputies' benches in the Federal Capital" (Repetto 1956, 28).
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 TABLE 1 Percentages of Votes Obtained by the Major Argentine Political Parties from
 1930 to 1954
 Partido Union Cfvica Terceras Partido Blank % of
 Year Socialista Radical Fuerzas Peronista Ballots Voters
 1930 24.1 24.1 31.7a 86.1
 1931 45.8 24.2a 86.9
 1934 31.8 14.1b 9.7c 8.9 80.3
 1935 41.3 3.5d 70c 70.2
 1936 22.9 41.6 2.7a 7.8 80.3
 1937 5.7 55.5 23.9c 88.2
 1938 14.6 26.9 19.Oc 77.9
 1940 23.4 32.3 14.3c 80.9
 1942 26.0 22.8 16.8c 75.5
 1946 16.0 18.3 1 h.Oe 42.1 88.5
 1948f 16.3 18.0 43.8 83.5
 1948g 27.0 45.6 6.3 83.8
 1954 40.3 0.4h 45.1 1.2 89.7
 NOTE: The percentages were calculated based on all registered voters.
 a Socialismo Independiente
 b UCR Talcahuano combined with UCR Avenida de Mayo
 c Concordancia, which in 1940 included 0.8% of Socialismo Independiente
 d Partido Radical
 eUnidad y Resistencia (Democracia Progresista y Comunistas)
 f Deputy elections
 g Election of representatives (constituyentes) to modify the constitution
 h Democracia Progresista
 place. For these years, we chose to analyze all the elections of deputies (in
 1931, 1934,1936,1938,1940, and 1942), one of senators (1935), and one for
 the president (1937).6
 The Partido Socialista
 Table 2 presents the coefficients of simple linear correlation be-
 tween the vote for the PS and several sociodemographic or occupational
 variables. It includes for comparative purposes the correlations for the
 deputy elections of 1930 (see table 2).7
 6. Whenever possible, we have emphasized deputy elections because of the broader dis-
 persion of the vote and the greater frequency of this kind of election.
 7. As in our other studies on these topics, we use coefficients of simple linear correlation as
 descriptive summaries of various political forces and many variables. For more specific ar-
 guments, we have introduced some multiple regression equations. In a tenuous defense of
 use of these coefficients from severe criticism, Luskin has proposed, "When prior theory is
 weak enough, correlations may provide clues for subsequent models. Weathervanes and
 anemometers in the cities do not diminish the value of a wet finger aloft in the wilderness"
 (Luskin 1991, 1037). We recognize that we are dealing with "ecological correlations," that is,
 with associations among aggregates. Consequently, we must bear in mind the risk of com-
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 TABLE 2 Coefficients of Simple Linear Correlations for Percentages of Votes Cast for the
 Partido Socialista from 1930 to 1942
 Variable 1930 1931 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1940 1942
 Price of real estate
 per square meter -.73 -.77 -.72 -.78 -.63 -.62 -.69 -.42 -.63
 Illiteracy (1936) .78 .65 .67 .52 .52 .62 .59 .16 .37
 Families without
 servants (1936) .71 .79 .83 .80 .77 .70 .72 .54 .67
 Young women
 working (1936) .63 .57 .62 .39 .58 .67 .56 .42 .46
 Semi-skilled workers .72 .49 .53 .27 .34 .44 .40 -.03 .17
 Skilled workers .83 .89 .85 .74 .78 .72 .81 .54 .74
 Low nonmanual -.43 -.51 -.50 -.19 -.36 -.38 -.42 -.05 -.24
 Medium nonmanual -.50 -.58 -.56 -.33 -.37 -.50 -.47 -.01 -.26
 High nonmanual -.88 -.80 -.82 -.87 -.72 -.72 -.76 -.43 -.64
 Low professional -.66 -.69 -.79 -.84 -.70 -.62 -.66 -.47 -.62
 High professional -.85 -.87 -.85 -.82 -.78 -.76 -.78 -.53 -.70
 Manual workers .90 .78 .78 .58 .64 .66 .69 .29 .52
 Nonmanual workers -.68 -.62 -.60 -.34 -.45 -.49 -.52 -.10 -.33
 Professionals -.90 -.85 -.88 -.89 -.79 -.75 -.78 -.54 -.71
 Students -.84 -.61 -.64 -.40 -.53 -.60 -.50 -.24 -.35
 Day laborers .68 .58 .51 .38 .45 .43 -.02 .26
 Clerical workers .28 -.27 -.03 -.16 -.13 -.24 .06 -.10
 Store owners -.54 -.54 -.34 -.36 -.45 -.42 .02 -.25
 Growth in registered
 voters from one
 election to another .47 .48 -.49 -.08 -.63 .07 -.34 -.17
 Sources: Electoral data came from the Memnorias del Ministerio del Interior. The occupational
 data are from Walter (1993); his occupational data were derived from the voter registry of
 1934. The sociodemographic data come from the Censo Municipal of 1936, except for the
 price of real estate per square foot, taken from the Anuarios Estadisticos of the MCBA for 1926
 and 1927
 NOTE: Correlations are weighted by voter registrations for each year. A value equal to or
 greater than .45 is statistically significant at 5 percent.
 The consistency of high PS correlations over the entire period
 should be pointed out. This finding replicates those shown by the PS in the
 years 1912-1930, although with somewhat lower correlations.8 This no-
 table pattern is even more striking when compared with those of the other
 political parties from 1913 until 1942.
 mitting the "ecological fallacy" by attributing to individuals the values of the relations
 among aggregates. In addition to the classic work of Robinson (1950), see Achen and Shively
 (1995).
 8. The correlations among the percentages of socialist votes came down a bit in 1935 (the
 senate election) and in 1937 (the presidential election, when the socialist votes split between
 their own party and the radical candidate).
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 The independent variables used in the study were virtually all
 those available by district that were relevant to the proposed analysis. The
 categories for occupations and literacy are usually essential to exploring
 the socio-spatial bases of voting. The price of real estate per square meter
 (for 1926-1927) is the only variable characterizing the districts that does
 not result from the sum of individuals. It is also the only indicator of high
 status. The remaining sociodemographic variables, drawn from the Censo
 Municipal of 1936, are among the few that are specified by district. They
 follow illiteracy in their behavior, all of them running counter to the price
 of real estate. Occupations are indicators of social class (always from a
 socio-spatial perspective) that together with the sociodemographic vari-
 ables reveal the socio-spatial level of the districts.
 The correlation of the Socialist vote with the type of variables men-
 tioned, throughout the twenty electoral districts, reveals a high negative co-
 efficient with the indicators of higher socioeconomic level (the price of real
 estate per square meter) and a positive one with the lower-level indicators
 (illiteracy, families without servants, and homes with young women
 working). This pattern is repeated when analyzing the vote for the PS and
 the occupational categories: high negative coefficients for all the nonman-
 ual categories (particularly professionals) and high positives with labor-
 ers, skilled as well as semi-skilled.
 Halfway through the period (in 1935) and even more so by 1940,
 this trend began to change. Both positive and negative correlations went
 down, suggesting a less dichotomized pattern, although the relationship
 almost never reversed. In any case, toward the end of this phase, during
 1940-1942, the Socialist spatial profile seems to have begun to change, an-
 ticipating the impact that it would suffer with the emergence of Peronism.
 This decline in the Socialist pattern from 1940 to 1946 could have
 been due to the rise of a party with a popular base like Concentracion
 Obrera (CO). This party had participated in deputy elections since 1931
 (after the coup of 1930) and competed with the PS on its own turf. The cor-
 relations for the CO are more positive for the variables indicating poverty
 than those of the PS and more negative for those indicating wealth. That
 is to say, electoral growth of the CO and its socio-spatial profile seemed to
 indicate that a party with more pronounced working-class characteristics
 could dislodge the PS from its place of honor as the electoral choice of the
 working sectors. Although the CO was a small party, the 30,000 votes it re-
 ceived between 1940 and 1942 should not be discounted, particularly if
 they were mostly worker votes. These votes could have influenced the
 variations in pattern of other parties, particularly the PS. Alfredo Galletti
 described the CO as a party that became a nucleus for "elements of in-
 dustrial labor" (1961, 111).9 It emerged from a schism within the Partido
 9. In an interview with Ruggiero Rugilo, Corbiere recorded this comment: "The majority
 of the Partido Comunista, especially workers, came with us.... The mass of affiliated unions
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 Comunista (PC), the result of confrontations between PC leader Jose
 Penelon and the Ghioldi-Codovilla faction in 1927 and 1928 (see Puiggros
 1967-1968, 3:97ff).10
 As will be shown, the PS's weakened "popular profile" (in spatial
 terms) was the last profile of the party reflecting a pattern of this type.
 After the emergence of Peronism, the PS's spatial image approximated
 that of the conservative parties. Moreover, the PS never again embodied
 the somewhat vague profile of pre-Peronist radicalismo.11 Along with
 emerging Peronism, the PC and the CO (although possessing fewer re-
 sources than socialismo in the capital) were the parties that expressed this
 traditional "popular pattern" previously characteristic of the PS.
 The Union Civica Radical
 The UCR per se made its official reentry debut in 1936. In 1934 and
 1935, some of the factions had competed without official endorsement.
 The consistency of UCR correlations from 1936 to 1942 is high, somewhat
 higher than those exhibited in the previous period (1912-1930), except in
 the presidential elections of 1937 in which radical forces received signifi-
 ended up in our party-woodworkers, construction workers, shoemakers, printers, tailors"
 (Corbiere 1984, 79).
 10. Corbiere indicated that printer Jos6 Fernando Penel6n "was the main protagonist of the
 Partido Socialista Internacional and the first steps taken by Argentine communists. He does
 not show up in the official histories. Nor do those who could remember those days-social-
 ists, communists, and anarchists-include him in their books. Yet Penel6n occupied a deci-
 sive place in working-class history of this century" (Corbiere 1984, 7). Corbiere explained in
 detail that as soon as Penel6n separated himself from the PC, he created the Partido Comu-
 nista de la Regi6n Argentina in about 1930. A year later, the word Region was replaced with
 Republica. Sometime after 1931, "the sector adopted the name of Concentraci6n Obrera....
 The name was taken from its European counterpart: Concentraci6n Obrera Antifascista....
 One fact to conclude this subject: Concentraci6n Obrera opposed Per6n in 1945. Penel6n con-
 fronted the Peronist regime, but he was one of the few voices from the Left who condemned
 the Uni6n Democratica" (Corbiere 1984, 9). Corbiere's interpretation is that penelonismo "was
 a manifestation of the so-called comunismo occidental that inspired Nikolai Bukharin and
 other Soviets killed during the tragic trials in Moscow in 1936 by order of Stalin. This vein of
 communism is echoed to some extent in contemporary Italian, French, and Spanish 'Euro-
 comunism"' (Corbiere 1984, 8).
 11. As Adelman (1992) pointed out, this conclusion does not imply causal assumptions in
 order to explain populismo by the "failure of socialismo" in Argentina-and in Latin Amer-
 ica-to generate lasting electoral support from the working class for an alternative to demo-
 cratic socialism. Adelman explained, "Moreover, the concern to explain the success of pop-
 ulism by pointing to the failure of socialism presumes that socialism would have made
 inroads among the working classes if they had promoted a prototype of what later would
 emerge as a populist discourse. The assumption implies that the masses, whoever they were,
 were ready for mobilization and provided the natural political space for a progressive move-
 ment" (Adelman 1992, 212). From our perspective, these discussions ignore the notable
 worker support that the Partido Socialista seems to have relied on in elections in the capital,
 particularly before 1930.
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 cant support from the Left. The unofficial groupings that ran in 1934 and
 1935 show a less-defined pattern, the faction called the Partido Radical
 coming the closest in 1935 to the earlier official pattern of the UCR, even
 though the PR reaped few votes. Another grouping that came close to the
 official pattern was the UCR Talcahuano in 1934, given that the UCR
 Avenida de Mayo in that same year showed negative correlations with al-
 most all the radical forces in all elections analyzed.
 Table 3 lists the correlations for the official UCR and the unofficial
 groupings of 1934 and 1935, with sociodemographic variables. The official
 UCR, from 1936 onward, repeated the patterns faintly established in the
 years 1912-1930, suggesting a party encouraged by various sectors with-
 out being preeminent among any of them. The UCR won almost all these
 elections, except that in 1942. Its correlations are low and not significant,
 the signs changing in some cases from one election to the next. The ex-
 ception already pointed out is the presidential election of 1937, in which
 the UCR presented a profile similar to the one exhibited up to that point
 by the PS.12
 The Terceras Fuerzas
 In this era, the Partido Socialista Independiente stood out only
 twice, in 1931 and in 1936. Although it competed in 1940, its participation
 was negligible. In reality, the PSI practically disappeared after the elec-
 tions of 1931, at the beginning of the period, when it achieved 24.2 percent
 of the votes, falling in 1936 to 2.7 percent and in 1940 to 0.8 percent. Con-
 cordancia, which reached its highest percentage of votes in 1937 (24.0 per-
 cent), maintained an appreciable presence in the elections of 1934, 1935,
 1937,1938,1940, and 1942.13 These third-party forces, which were conser-
 12. The unofficial radicalismo of 1934 and 1935 is somewhat less defined in its socio-
 spatial profile (compared with oficialismo after 1935) and exhibited at times a different pro-
 file, one apparently somewhat more "popular."
 13. Regarding the birth of this movement, Tussie and Federman (1973) reported: "The con-
 servatives, who had reappeared after 6 September, decided to launch themselves in the po-
 litical arena under a new name-and thus was born the party named Dem6crata Nacional.
 This new party, together with anti-personalist radicalismo and independent socialismo, pro-
 moted the candidacy of [Agustin P.] Justo, a decision foreseeable several months in advance.
 The collusion was officially baptized and the name of Concordancia was coined" (Tussie
 and Federman 1973, 37-38). In a technical report on the conservative forces, Jorge Ossona
 noted: "The so-called 'fraude patri6tico' and the radical abstention facilitated the triumph of
 this coalition. In 1937 Concordancia ran the Ortiz-Castillo slate, which won again by virtue
 of fraud" (Ossona 1983, 50). Tussie and Federman observed about these elections, "by means
 of a switch of ballot boxes in the mail, Justo guaranteed the triumph of the oficialista candi-
 date. One feature of these elections was the popular conviction that nothing could be done
 about the fraud. It was an open secret that Ortiz would be elected even though the majority
 of the electorate voted for Alvear. The consequence of this belief was the increased number
 of abstentions" (Tussie and Federman 1973, 39).
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 TABLE 3 Coefficients of Simple Linear Correlation for Percentages of Votes for the Union
 Civica Radical from 1930 to 1942
 UCRa TALCb MAYOc PRADd UCR UCR UCR UCR UCR
 Variable 1930 1934 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1940 1942
 Price of real
 estate per
 square meter -.42 -.46 -.25 -.52 -.41 -.74 -.41 -.39 -.40
 Illiteracy (1936) .28 .08 .55 .15 -.21 .49 -.26 -.14 -.00
 Families without
 servants (1936) .52 .15 .36 .25 .13 .66 .03 .10 .33
 Young women
 working (1936) .33 -.22 .27 -.18 -.28 .33 -.36 -.25 -.06
 Semi-skilled
 workers .28 .08 .47 .07 -.32 .35 -.35 -.22 -.15
 Skilled workers .13 .39 .28 .41 .15 .74 .17 .08 .20
 Low nonmanual .38 -.27 -.32 -.15 .27 -.39 .21 .25 .18
 Middle
 nonmanual -.01 -.21 -.27-.19 .13 -.42 .12 .08 .11
 High nonmanual -.45 -.39 -.35 -.46 -.21 -.71 -.21 -.22 -.37
 Low professional -.29 .02 -.35 -.29 -.08 -.53 .00 -.11 -.28
 High professional -.49 -.27 -.43 -.33 -.23 -.75 -.16 -.20 -.34
 Manual workers .19 .26 .42 .27 -.09 .62 -.09 -.08 .04
 Nonmanual
 workers .14 -.30 -.34 -.22 .20 -.48 .15 .17 .11
 Professionals -.50 -.15 -.42 -.33 -.18 -.69 -.09 -.17 -.33
 Students -.37 -.01 -.40 .04 .18 -.47 .32 .17 -.02
 Day laborers .35 .15 .44 .28 .75 .20 .36 .43
 Clerical workers -.31 -.23 -.20 .28 -.19 .12 .25 .25
 Store owners -.20 -.26 -.25 .08 -.41 .06 -.04 .05
 Growth in registra-
 tions from one elec-
 tion to another .56 -.28 -.09 .28 -.24 -.15 .49 .15
 Sources: See table 2.
 NOTE: Correlations are weighted by voter registrations for each year. A value equal or su-
 perior to .45 is statistically significant at 5 percent. The UCR ran officially only since 1936. In
 1934 various slates presented themselves, of which we have emphasized the two main ones
 (the correlation between them is -.32). In 1935, we took the only radical slate that competed.
 a Uni6n Civica Radical
 b Uni6n Civica Radical Talcahuano
 c Uni6n Civica Radical Avenida de Mayo
 d Partido Radical
 vative in nature, showed high correlations among themselves until 1938,
 although they went down a little that year. These groups suffered a sig-
 nificant decline in 1940, showing negative correlations. This election
 seems to have been somewhat atypical, given the positive correlations re-
 gained in 1942, which attained levels higher that those of 1938. Perhaps
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 part of this was due to the presence of more than one conservative force
 in the elections of 1938 and 1940, which would have tended to blur their
 patterns on diversifying the channels for the vote among these groups.
 A reading of table 4 shows, as the most general pattern, a positive
 high association until 1937 of the various conservative forces with the
 variables indicating a higher socioeconomic level and a high negative as-
 sociation with the indicators of lower status (see table 4). This panorama
 changed in 1938 and even more in 1940 but reverted to the earlier patterns
 to a certain extent in 1942.
 A common denominator among the various forces-socialismo,
 radicalismo, and parties of a more conservative stripe-was that the elec-
 toral volatility seen between 1938 and 1942, compared with the patterns
 recognized up to 1936 or perhaps 1937, began to affect the patterns or
 socio-spatial profiles of the parties, as if to presage the drastic changes to
 come in the electoral spectrum in 1946. A party with working-class traits
 like the CO held fast from 1938 to 1940 (duplicating its votes) and even
 grew some in 1942 (receiving 6 percent).
 Meanwhile, the PS lost more than 30,000 votes between 1936 and
 1938, perhaps to Socialismo Obrero (or to Concentracion Obrera). Social-
 ismo Obrero grew in 1938 (receiving 26,500 votes) as an offshoot of the of-
 ficial trunk of the PS, then disappeared in 1940 only to reappear in 1942,
 although with a meager total (4,000 votes). Socialismo Obrero was thus an
 ephemeral offshoot that was almost consumed in the experience of 1938.
 Galletti (1961) pointed out that this party, "with a fleeting trajectory . . .,
 went on to enlarge the Communist ranks" (1961, 111).14 In contrast, the
 CO (originally an offshoot of the PC) tended to consolidate electorally to-
 ward the end of these years (1940-1942) but then lost its support drasti-
 cally following the rise of Peronism. In 1940 the PS recaptured and ex-
 panded its following (garnering more than 47,000 votes), apparently
 retaking some of the votes that Socialismo Obrero had captured in 1938. In
 1942 the PS improved a bit over 1940, although it remained far from its
 sources of support when the UCR did not run candidates in the elections.
 In general, considering the possible resources more its own, the PS repre-
 sented in that period one-quarter of the electorate of Buenos Aires in the
 election of deputies.
 Radicalismo meanwhile lost almost 55,000 votes between 1936 and
 1938 but recovered more than 30,000 between 1938 and 1940, perhaps
 some of those that Concordancia had snatched away in 1938. In 1942 the
 14. Jauregui and Fernandez observed, "in 1936 another ailing limb had been pruned from
 the socialist trunk: the Partido Socialista Obrero, which backed the candidacy of [Marcelo
 de] Alvear. This gave rise to a lengthy verbal confrontation with the PS that echoed audibly
 in the campaign.... The adherence of working-class socialismo to the radical candidate oc-
 casioned laughable situations, such as the placement of a large portrait of Alvear next to one
 of Marx at each of their very colorful functions" (Jauregui and Fernandez 1983, 87-88).
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 TABLE 4 Coefficients of Simple Linear Correlation for Percentages of Votes Cast for the
 Terceras Fuerzas from 1930 to 1942
 PSI PSI CONC CONC PSI CONC CONC CONC CONC
 Variable 1930 1931 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1940 1942
 Price of real estate
 per square meter .60 .71 .72 .74 .59 .70 .44 .09 .43
 Illiteracy (1936) -.90 -.77 -.79 -.49 -.74 -.67 -.02 .34 -.29
 Families without
 servants (1936) -.70 -.86 -.89 -.82 -.78 -.78 -.47 -.22 -.65
 Young women
 working (1936) -.77 -.71 -.69 -.55 -.74 -.59 -.22 -.10 -.53
 Semi-skilled
 workers -.84 -.64 -.65 -.32 -.61 -.54 .13 .44 -.10
 Skilled workers -.67 -.84 -.82 -.79 -.71 -.78 -.44 -.04 -.50
 Low nonmanual .33 .55 .54 .34 .51 .51 -.06 -.36 .09
 Middle nonmanual .48 .63 .58 .36 .54 .52 .07 -.38 .11
 High nonmanual .74 .83 .85 .77 .71 .76 .42 .02 .50
 Low professional .83 .76 .77 .65 .65 .63 .34 .11 .47
 High professional .71 .90 .93 .85 .79 .82 .46 .12 .60
 Manual workers -.80 -.84 -.83 -.63 -.74 -.75 -.18 .22 -.34
 Nonmanual
 workers .57 .67 .64 .44 .59 .60 .03 -.35 .16
 Professionals .83 .90 .92 .81 .78 .78 .44 .12 .58
 Students .79 .79 .80 .61 .78 .70 .23 -.02 .48
 Day laborers -.73 -.69 -.68 -.70 -.80 -.38 -.12 -.51
 Clerical workers .25 .23 .06 .18 .22 -.25 -.49 -.19
 Store owners .57 .52 .33 .47 .47 .00 -.38 .09
 Growth in registra-
 tions from one elec-
 tion to the next -.42 -.45 .02 .01 .28 -.08 -.00 -.18
 Sources: See table 2.
 NOTE: Correlations are weighted by enrollments for each year. A value equal to or greater
 than .45 is statistically significant at 5 percent. The PSI refers to the Partido Socialista Inde-
 pendiente; CONC is short for Concordancia.
 UCR obtained almost 10 percent less than it had received in 1930. Alberto
 Ciria commented, "Radicalismo, after 6 September, went into a slide from
 which it never recovered for the entire decade" (Ciria 1975,28). Yet that trend
 did not translate at the electoral level, at least in the Federal Capital. When
 the UCR could or did run candidates again in 1936 and 1937, it won these
 elections by a wide margin. The party won again in 1938 and 1940, although
 by a narrow margin and with a smaller following, losing only in 1942.
 THE SECOND PHASE, 1946-1954
 After the rise of Peronism, the votes for each party were highly cor-
 related with the votes for the same party in successive elections. Similarly,
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 the socio-spatial profiles that emerged in 1946, more clearly defined than
 ever, continued almost unchanged until 1954.15
 Peronism now showed a clearly "popular profile," one typical of so-
 cialismo before 1930 (see table 5). The UCR represented the other side of the
 coin, with very high positive correlations with sociodemographic variables
 or occupational indicators of wealth and negative correlations with those
 indicating poverty. The PS profile was similar to that of the UCR, although
 somewhat less pronounced. As it turned out, the PC and the CO were the
 parties that displayed socio-spatial patterns similar to those of Peronism.16
 These results of simple linear correlations for the Federal Capital coincide
 with those of Germani (1955) and Little (1973). But the occupational data
 differ from those of Germani and for certain years from those of Little, who
 worked also with other units (circuits) in the capital.17 (For electoral pur-
 poses, the city of Buenos Aires was divided into 20 circunscripciones or sec-
 tions and 209 circuitos or precincts.) As will be discussed, this socio-spatial
 polarized pattern of the occupational categories yields gradations when
 certain multiple regression equations are considered.
 15. We are not considering here the elections of 1951, given the handling of geographical
 redistribution of the districts in the Federal Capital by oficialismo, which made comparisons
 impossible. We were unable to obtain the results by circuits of that date, which would have
 allowed us to reconstruct the traditional districts.
 16. One example would be the elections of Constituyentes in 1948, when the CO as well as
 the PC ran: the CO had a correlation of .77 with manual workers, -.68 with nonmanual work-
 ers, and -.75 with professionals. The PC had one of .78 with manual workers, -.67 with non-
 manual workers, and -.79 with professionals.
 17. Germani used unpublished occupational data from the Census of 1947. Little worked
 with occupational data listed in the voter registry (padrdn), as we did except that ours corre-
 spond to 1934 while his came from the Peronist era (circa 1950). Moreover, Little calculated
 rank-order correlations (as did Germani) based on the occupations of a group of six
 precincts (circuitos). We have continued to use the occupational data listed in the voter reg-
 istry of 1934 because we consider them much closer to the electoral data. The correlations for
 comparable categories among the occupational data of the census lists of 1934 with those of
 the Census of 1947 (t. 41, unpublished) for the Federal Capital are very high (positive): for
 workers in general .89, industrial workers (1947) with skilled workers (1934) .92, clerical
 workers .73, and professionals .94. The lowest correlation (but still positive and statistically
 significant) is that of clerical workers, the category most difficult to compare. Similarly, we
 used the last available value for the price of real estate per square meter from the year
 1926-1927, even for correlations with voting data from 1946 to 1954. We did so because it is
 the only nonoccupational indicator of middle-upper and upper class that exhibits a notable
 consistency in significant positive correlations since the beginning of the twentieth century,
 such as 1904 with 1926-1927, .94; and 1909 with 1926-1927, .98. In addition, this variable ex-
 hibits coherent correlations with occupations in 1934 (which in turn shows very high corre-
 lations with equivalents of 1947). All this is consistent with the relative constancy of rela-
 tionships among the twenty traditional districts throughout the twentieth century. Two
 examples will suffice: the correlation between illiteracy of those listed in the voter registry of
 1916 and illiteracy of the economically active population (fourteen and older) in the census
 of 1960 is .86, while the correlation between the number of persons per room in 1904 (Censo
 municipal ) and in 1991 (Censo nacional) is .62.
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 TABLE 5 Coefficients of Simple Linear Correlation for Percentages of Votes Cast for Peron-
 ism, the Union Civica Radical, and the Partido Socialista from 1946 to 1954
 PLABa UCRb pSc ppd UCRb pSc ppd UCRb ppd UCRb
 Variable 1946 1946 1946 1948a 1948a 1948a 1948b 1948b 1954 1954
 Price of real
 estate per
 square meter -.69 .65 .42 -.60 .46 .21 -.57 .45 -.54 .39
 Illiteracy (1936) .88 -.86 -.79 .80 -.88 -.64 .77 -.92 .82 -.84
 Families without
 servants (1936) .89- .94- .78 .85 -.87 -.58 .85 -.86 .84 -.79
 Young women
 working (1936) .63 -.74 -.62 .50 -.77 -.50 .51 -.78 .55 -.65
 Semi-skilled
 workers .75 -.73 -.70 .66 -.80 -.58 .63 -.83 .70 -.76
 Skilled workers .80 -.84 -.55 .72 -.70 -.34 .71 -.68 .67 -.55
 Low nonmanual -.64 .65 .56 -.56 .68 .45 -.56 .70 -.57 .60
 Middle
 nonmanual -.63 .58 .46 -.51 .59 .29 -.47 .58 -.49 .46
 High
 nonmanual -.86 .85 .65 -.79 .72 .42 -.76 .70 -.77 .65
 Low
 professional -.78 .83 .67 -.75 .74 .54 -.75 .75 -.78 .74
 High
 professional -.89 .90 .66 -.81 .77 .41 -.77 .75 -.75 .64
 Manual workers .86 -.87 -.70 .76 -.83 -.51 .74 -.84 .75 -.72
 Nonmanual
 workers -.73 .72 .60- .63 .72 .45 -.62 .73 -.63 .62
 Professionals .90 .93 .71 -.84 .81 .50 -.81 .81 -.82 .73
 Students -.83 .86 .82 -.77 .95 .62 -.75 .93 -.76 .81
 Day laborers .87 -.72 -.85 .83 -.70 -.77 .84 -.80 .87 -.82
 Clerical workers -.34 .35 .25 -.28 .33 .22 -.29 .37 -.30 .32
 Store owners -.60 .54 .43 -.48 .51 .29 -.45 .54 -.44 .40
 Growth in reg-
 istrations from
 one election
 to the next .62 -.50 -.67 .66 -.34 -.76 .68 -.46 .61 -.51
 Sources: Voting data, from Canton (1968) and the daily La Prensa; the occupational data were
 taken from Walter (1993), and the sociodemographic from the Censo Municipal of 1936, ex-
 cept for the price of real estate, from the Anuarios Estad[sticos de la MCBA for 1926 and 1927.
 NOTE: Coefficients are weighted by enrollments of each year. A value equal to or greater
 than .45 is significant at 5 percent. The elections in 1946 and 1948a were for deputies; those
 labeled 1948b were for Constituyentes; those for 1954 for vice president (men only).
 a Partido Laborista (later Partido Peronista)
 b Uni6n Civica Radical
 c Partido Socialista
 d Partido Peronista
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 Finally, within the boundaries of the capital, the emergence of Peron-
 ism seems to have lagged disproportionately in the same districts where
 the PS, the PC, and the CO had earlier obtained their best electoral results.
 This interpretation can be inferred from the value of the positive signifi-
 cant correlations between these forces in the years before Peronism and
 the laborista vote of 1946. It may be that the same sectors that supported
 these leftist groups became inclined toward the labor movement. That is
 to say, former voters for the Partido Socialista, the Partido Communista,
 and Concentracion Obrera joined the ranks of the new party in 1946.
 A DEBATED ISSUE
 One theme that has stimulated debate is the role played by internal
 migrants in worker presence in the rise of Peronism.18 The main topics dis-
 cussed have been the role and weight of the workers with and without an
 electoral political tradition, the role of migrants, and the role of other oc-
 cupational or class sectors as possibly relevant components of Peronist
 support in February 1946. The orthodox interpretation was advanced by
 Germani, who attributed a preponderant weight in the rise of Peronism to
 recent migrants, particularly less-skilled workers who had no electoral
 political tradition or one tied to the populist caudillismo of the provinces.
 Subsequently, Hiroshi Matsushita asserted, "from the empirical perspec-
 tive with which we wish to analyze worker participation in the origins of
 Peronism, the orthodox interpretation [of Germani] has a serious defect:
 it is impossible to document the support of this migrant mass for Peron in
 the period 1943-1946" (Matsushita 1983, 14). Approximations have been
 attempted nevertheless to distinguish between the effect of workers and
 that of migrants. Within the limits of our data for the Federal Capital, the
 main effect on the Peronist vote (in socio-spatial terms) seems to corre-
 spond to worker presence, whereas the effect added by the presence of
 "migrants" to that of workers appears minimal. To reach this conclusion,
 we used as an approximation of "migrants" the growth from 1942 to 1946
 in the voter registrations in the censuses of the capital (that is why we put
 "migrants" in quotation marks). A significant increase occurred, which
 was due neither to natural growth nor to massive acquisition of citizen-
 ship by resident foreigners. 19
 18. See Germani (1973), Smith (1974), Halperin Donghi (1975), Kenworthy (1975), and
 Ranis (1975).
 19. In a compilation of studies of the development of the Argentine population, Lattes and
 Lattes found that for the period 1935-1945, 100 percent of the growth in the population of
 the city of Buenos Aires reflected migration, basically by natives (Lattes and Lattes 1975, p.
 131, t. 5.7). The study also emphasized this era as the last period of great growth in the pop-
 ulation of the city, approaching a rate of 20 percent. From the perspective of the changes in
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 A linear combination of both variables, manual laborers and "mi-
 grants," accounts for 78 percent of the variability in the Peronist vote (R2
 corrected equals .78), as always in socio-spatial terms.20 The two variables
 enter significantly-more workers-in a regression equation (standard-
 ized variables), with the laborista vote as a dependent variable,21 for the
 twenty districts of the capital. The simple linear correlations with the la-
 borista vote of manual workers (.83) and that of "migrants" (.48) are both
 significant, the coefficient of the first (.768) being relevantly higher than
 the second (.347). One way of getting closer to specifying the effects of
 each one is to distinguish the direct effect of workers on the laborista vote
 (.768) while keeping "migrants" constant, that is, the indirect effect of
 these workers given the presence of migrants in that vote (.061), which to-
 gether total the generalized effect of workers on the laborista vote (.830).
 The added effect of the presence of "migrants" approaches 8 percent on
 considering the effect of the presence of workers.22 This outcome recurs
 when considering separately the equation for semi-skilled workers as well
 as skilled workers and "migrants."23 That is to say, the effect of the "mi-
 the electoral lists in the Federal Capital, registrations grew from 1935 to 1946 by 215,261 per-
 sons (a 50 percent increase over the number in 1935). Except for an important spurt from 1937
 to 1938, the greatest growth took place in the years 1942-1946. Of the 100 percent increase be-
 tween 1935 and 1946, 48.1 percent occurred from 1942 to 1946, and the remaining 51.9 per-
 cent between 1935 and 1942. We have chosen to consider the growth in registrations in
 1942-1946 rather than that of 1935-1946 because the shorter period promised to distinguish
 better the new "migrant workers" supposedly lacking a political or voting tradition, accord-
 ing to Germani. By any measure, the correlation between one growth spurt and the other is
 very high and positive, .90. At the same time, we recognize that our approximation of "mi-
 grants" could be subject to the criticism that Germani made with respect to the "contamina-
 tion" introduced by the practice of the census offices of considering as migration moves from
 the surburban areas to the Capital (and vice versa), given our definition of "migrants." We
 do not know the extent of the movement from the suburbs in comparison with that from the
 interior provinces toward the Capital. Our unit of analysis is the Federal Capital itself, not
 the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires. Finally, we note that the simple linear correlation (not
 weighted by registrations) of "migrants" with workers is .18; migrants with semi-skilled
 workers is .07; and migrants with skilled workers is .23-none of them significant. On the
 contrary, the crrelation with day laborers is positive and significant at .52, although few are
 found in the voter registry of the Federal Capital.
 20. One should keep in mind the caveats raised by authors like Achen (1982) about treat-
 ing R-square as the percentage of variance explained.
 21. To allow comparison, we standardized the presidential vote, calculated as Germani did
 on the sum of votes cast.
 22. The same is expressed by the coefficient of partial correlation between the laborista
 vote and that of manual workers, controlling for "migrants," which reaches .864, when the
 coefficient of simple linear correlation between the first two was already showing a value
 of .830.
 23. The direct effect of semi-skilled workers on the laborista vote, keeping "migrants" con-
 stant, is .643; the indirect, given the presence of "migrants," is .030, which yields a general-
 ized effect of semi-skilled workers on the laborista vote of .673. The equivalent values for
 skilled workers are .688, .075, and .763. As can be seen, the variation in the behavior of the
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 grants" is small when added to the effect that the workers have on their
 own, skilled or not. In the multiple regression equation of the laborista
 vote among semi-skilled, skilled, clerical workers, and "migrants," the fol-
 lowing weights (regression coefficients) are observed for each of these
 variables, all statistically significant: .780, .659, .636, and .102.
 A linear combination of these four variables explains some 89 per-
 cent of the variation in the laborista vote (R2 corrected equals .89; standard
 error of regression equals .020).24 Although statistically significant, the
 "migrants" explain much less of the variance than the rest. Moreover, ac-
 cording to this equation, the laborista movement is linked more closely
 with the districts with more workers, skilled or not, and more clerical
 workers. This finding suggests that in the capital, the rise of Peronism
 rested primarily on the support of skilled, semi-skilled, and clerical work-
 ers, bolstered to a minor degree by the presence of the "migrants." Ger-
 mani's statements regarding a strong presence of new migrant (less-
 skilled) laborers in the Peronist camp are not supported for the Federal
 Capital, given that the increase in the effect of workers, skilled or not, on
 the laborista vote, when the presence of "migrants" is taken into account,
 is very small.25
 Inclusion of the "migrants" has a greater impact when equations
 are calculated with independent variables having high correlations among
 themselves (multicollinearity), which affects the estimates. This outcome
 occurs with our data as well as with those of Germani, although his data
 referred to a broader geographic area and to other units. Our equation em-
 ploying practically the same variables that he considered on analyzing
 144 departments shows similar tendencies, setting aside the problems of
 multicollinearity.26
 various categories of workers in the presence of migrants is small, repeating what was seen
 for manual laborers as a whole.
 24. We have eliminated professionals from our estimates because of their high negative cor-
 relation with skilled workers (-.80). The category of professionals is also the independent
 variable that demonstrates a higher R2 (.912) when it is figured into a multiple regression
 equation as a dependent variable while keeping the rest as independent variables. Running
 the same equation but taking the other independent variables in turn as dependent, the de-
 creasing values of R2 are skilled workers .904, clerical workers .858, semi-skilled workers
 .710, and "migrants" .204. When including professionals, the values of the coefficients are
 semi-skilled workers .622, skilled workers, .299, clerical workers .308, professionals -.605, and
 "migrants" .099. Semi-skilled workers and "migrants" are statistically significant. R2 cor-
 rected equals .90.
 25. See the introduction by Juan Carlos Torre to his compilation (1988) for a synthesis of in-
 quiries in line with these results for the Federal Capital, but usually based on the metropoli-
 tan area of Buenos Aires or the place of origin of the migrants.
 26. The values of the regression coefficients in our equation (R2 corrected equals .91) are il-
 literacy (1936) 3.657, "migrants" .080, clerical workers .403, professionals -.231, semi-skilled
 workers .252, and skilled workers .342, none of them statistically significant. Germani's co-
 efficients were illiteracy (1947) -.160, migrants .214, clerical urban workers .118, clerical rural
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 Going beyond discussion of the role of the "migrants," we referred
 earlier to the positive presence of clerical workers. Table 5 reveals that the
 simple linear correlation-weighted by registrations-of the percentage
 of the laborista vote with the percentage of clerical workers was negative
 (-.34, going to -.14 for unweighted data) although not significant. When
 their weight is considered in multiple regression equations, it tends to be
 positive and usually significant. That is to say, when the presence of some
 other variables is kept constant, clerical workers have a positive weight in
 the laborista vote. One way of trying to specify this influence is to explore
 the direct and indirect effects of these clerical workers, controlling for ex-
 ample for literacy under the supposition that the lowest levels of routine
 clerical workers could have been integrated into labor support in the cap-
 ital in 1946. In the multiple regression equation of the laborista vote for
 president on literacy and clerical workers, we found a negative regression
 coefficient (-1.037) for literacy and a positive one (.349) for being in a cler-
 ical job, both significant. That is to say, the direct effect of clerical workers
 when keeping literacy constant is .349. Its indirect effect when literacy is
 taken into account is -.490, which yields a generalized negative effect of
 -.141 of the percentage of clerical workers on the percentage of the labor
 movement throughout the twenty districts of the capital.27
 Thus Germani's hypothesis proposing the decisive role of less-
 skilled workers, recently arrived native "migrants" with little political-
 electoral tradition or different one, is not supported by our data for the
 capital.28 Moreover, in this district it is "the laborers" who are generally
 workers .153, urban employers -.296, rural employers -.133, rural laborers .607, urban labor-
 ers .600, and industrial size .112. Regrettably, the statistically significant values of each coef-
 ficient are not indicated (their R2 is .44). But both equations have problems of "multi-
 collinearity." In our case, it was necessary to eliminate the variables for illiteracy and
 professionals. Regarding Germani's data, a text explaining regression analysis mentions one
 of Germani's equations as an example of the problems of multicollinearity (Lewis-Beck 1980,
 62-63). It points out the necessity of eliminating the variable rural laborers, which raises
 questions about the importance of the migration variable in explaining the rise of Peronism,
 contrary to what Germani showed in his equations. The equation that is reproduced in this
 work (data provided by Peter Snow to Lewis-Beck) does not appear in the original Germani
 text of 1973, and thus we do not know if they are elaborations of Snow's ultimately attributed
 to Germani. For this new equation that Snow gave to Lewis-Beck, the values were urban
 manual workers .28, urban nonmanual workers -.47, rural nonmanual workers -3.07, and in-
 ternal migrants .30, all of them significant (R2 equals .24). If the category of urban nonman-
 ual workers were made up only of clerical workers, then these results would be different
 from ours because of the positive weight that the clerical workers exhibited in the Capital, ac-
 cording to our equation.
 27. The literacy variable seemed the most appropriate for approximating the possible dis-
 tinctions of levels within the category of the employed. Both are positively correlated at .47,
 which is significant.
 28. According to Germani, his category of "urban laborers" (one of the few with positive
 significant weight that were important in his equation for large cities, including Greater
 Buenos Aires) would be composed mainly of this type of migrants. We do not know to what
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 those linked (socio-spatially) to the initial labor vote. Going beyond the
 debate between Eldon Kenworthy (1975) and Germani over the specifics
 of the labor sectors in Peronist support in 1946, our table 5 shows that jour-
 neymen as well as semi-skilled or skilled workers all exhibit high positive
 correlations with the labor vote, and therefore the high correlation for
 manual workers applies to all types of such workers.
 We can agree partially with Peter Smith (1972, 1974) when he as-
 serted that in the large urban centers, the older industrial workers had a
 significant weight greater than that of migrants. His equation for the big
 cities is the same as Germani's for towns of fifty thousand inhabitants and
 more. It also equals our results when we calculate similar regressions, al-
 though the positive presence of clerical workers did not emerge in Smith's
 analysis. Our results are similar to those that Germani obtained for all the
 departments, including Greater Buenos Aires (1973,445), even though we
 eliminated some variables because of problems of "multicollinearity."
 That is to say, in the capital (with 20 districts) as well as in all the depart-
 ments studied by Germani (144 cases), it seems that the Partido Laborista
 fared better in the districts with greater worker presence (skilled or not) or
 clerical workers (probably those with lower educational levels) or mi-
 grants.29 This outcome raises doubts regarding the relative weight that
 Smith awarded to industrial workers in the big cities, although our skilled
 workers as well as semi-skilled and journeymen as a separate group show
 higher correlations with the industrial workers of the 1947 census than
 with the workers in the primary sector of the same census.30 In our study
 as in those of Germani and Smith, the migrants have a positive weight
 lower than the other variables.
 CONCLUSION
 If the explanatory capacity of the "social class" variable is evalu-
 ated, as indicated by the occupation declared in the voter registry, it pro-
 vides a reasonable explanation of the vote, in socio-spatial terms, during
 the first half (1931-1936) of the era of the de facto or fraudulent govern-
 extent Germani attributed this characteristic to the workers of Greater Buenos Aires and to
 what extent to those of the Federal Capital.
 29. In the equation closest to ours, that for Greater Buenos Aires, Germani indicated that
 clerical workers were not considered in the regression. His other equations suggest that cler-
 ical workers had a positive weight when the smaller localities are taken into account and a
 negative one when the larger ones are considered. Our results for the Capital would contra-
 dict such an assertion.
 30. If we estimate using Smith's equation for large cities (see Mora y Araujo and Llorente
 1980, 67, t. 3) but for the twenty districts of the Capital-with skilled workers instead of in-
 dustrial workers-our results are similar to his. We obtain the same results if we replace
 skilled workers with manual laborers as a whole. Smith mentioned that the working class
 did not enter into his regression equation.
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 ments from 1931 to 1943. For the years 1912 to 1938, a three-way pattern
 emerges: socialismo obtained the best results in the districts with the
 largest concentrations of workers; the terceras fuerzas (basically conser-
 vative factions) did best in the districts containing more middle to upper
 sectors (professionals and the like); while radicalismo was somewhat un-
 differentiated socio-spatially, suggesting that it drew on varying sources
 of social support. That pattern continued until 1936.
 At that point, a moment of flux was induced by an unprecedented
 conjuncture of leftists and radical forces in the style of the popular fronts
 so fashionable in Europe the time. This moment was like that produced in
 the presidential election of 1937, in opposition to the conservative forces
 then dominating the political scene.
 This political effect faded after 1937. In 1938,1940, and 1942, neither
 Concordancia nor the UCR registered significant correlations with the
 disjunction between manual and nonmanual workers that we have em-
 phasized in our analysis. The PS showed differences until 1940, with only
 one significant value among four. That finding suggests that in 1942, the
 preexisting tendencies began to recur.
 With slight variations, the sociodemographic variables such as the
 price per square meter of real estate and illiteracy tend to support the pat-
 terns detected according to occupation. The price of real estate is system-
 atically negative with voting for the PS, almost always significant, and
 positive with illiteracy, although with correlations that get lower during
 the last two elections of the period before Peronism. Concordancia Obrera
 shows an inverse pattern to that of Socialismo, weakening in a certain
 sense in 1938 but recovering in 1942. The UCR offered a more varied pat-
 tern, negative in relation to the price of real estate, positive with illiteracy,
 with correlations rarely significant until 1935. From 1936 on (but exclud-
 ing the election of 1937), the correlations are negative with both variables,
 although the negativity with illiteracy tends to disappear toward the end
 of the era.
 In sum, we found patterns similar to those of 1912-1930 in the first
 half of the 1930s, a surprising conjunction between radicals and leftists in
 the presidential election of 1937, and subsequently generalized blurring of
 the earlier and most characteristic profiles of the parties between 1938 and
 1942, although the last year witnessed a restoration of the previous pat-
 terns. These conclusions clearly contradict certain observations in the lit-
 erature to the effect that socio-spatial class patterns began to emerge only
 in 1946 among Portefio voters. We are thus asserting that a relevant class
 vote did not begin in Argentina with the rise of Peronism.
 Politico-social alignments changed drastically with the arrival of
 Peronism, which unified into a single oppositional alliance all the parties
 that had vied earlier for primacy in the electoral arena, except for some
 minor defections. Peronism took on the traditional pattern of socialismo,
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 while after 1948 the UCR gave up its separate identity in order to unite
 under its leadership the vote opposing Peronist oficialismo.31 In the elec-
 tions for deputies, the leftist forces like the PS and the PC ran separately,
 showing patterns similar to that of radicalismo, although somewhat
 weaker. They seemed to end up being more parties of the middle class,
 given Peron's seizure of the popular vote. Beyond this black-and-white
 pattern indicated by the simple correlations, the regression analysis leads
 to questions about the weight of new migrant workers in the Peronist vote
 in the Federal Capital. Our analysis indicates instead that Peronism
 tended to be more closely linked with the districts with a greater presence
 of workers, skilled or not, and low-level clerical employees, making the
 contribution of migrants relatively minor.
 31. Given the opposition's continued criticisms of the Peronista governments as subjugat-
 ing or disregarding the rules of the democratic game as mere formalities, popular support at
 the ballot box was fundamental for the government. As an example, see the title of an offi-
 cial publication of the time issued by the Ministerio del Interior, with the voting results of the
 presidential reelection of 1951. This publication was called Confirmacion electoral de la volun-
 tad justicialista del pueblo argentino. It bore the same propagandistic title as an earlier publica-
 tion of similar intent, dedicated to recording the history of the elections from the passage of
 the Saenz Pefia law until 1946: Las Fuerzas Armadas restituiyen el imperio de la soberanfa popular.
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